时间：2025年4月9日（周三）9:30
地点：浙大管院A423会议室
主题：Disloyal Managers and Firms’ Silence about Investment Plans
主讲人：宋扬副教授，香港浸会大学会计、经济及金融学系系主任
主持人：王文明研究员，米兰体育（MLsports）
主持人简介：
Dr. Byron Song is an Associate Professor at the Department of Accountancy, Economics and Finance, School of Business, Hong Kong Baptist University. His research interests include financial reporting, debt market, auditing, and ESG. He has published his research work in various accounting and finance journals including The Accounting Review, Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, Journal of Banking and Finance, and Journal of Corporate Finance. Dr. Song is the Co-Editor of Accounting Forum and the Associate Editor of the Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics.
摘要：
Since 2000, several states enacted corporate opportunity waiver (COW) laws, which allow companies to waive fiduciaries’ duty of not pursuing business opportunities that could otherwise benefit their firms. Using the staggered adoption of COW laws, we find that affected firms reduce the likelihood and frequency of their capital expenditure forecasts, indicating that firms with potentially disloyal managers go silent on their investment plans. This reduction in forecasts is larger for firms with a CEO who is more likely to appropriate opportunities and smaller for firms with stronger external monitoring. Firms in COW-adopting states also exhibit lower investments, particularly firms that reduce their capital expenditure forecasts. Our study provides the novel insight that the presence of potentially disloyal managers is one reason that firms remain silent about their investment plans.
